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Sezai ÖZÇELİK

§

***EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE
CONFLICT IN THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA: THE
SOVIET GENOCIDE (SÜRGÜN) AND SITUATION OF
THE CRIMEAN TATARS***

§

***KIRIM YARIMADASINDAKİ ÇATIŞMANIN ANLAŞIL-
MASI ve AÇIKLANMASI: SOVYET SOYKIRIMI (SÜR-
GÜN) VE KIRIM TATARLARININ DURUMU***

§

**شرح وفهم النزاع في شبه جزيرة القرم ، وضع التتار القرم بعد التطهير
العرقى السوفيتي ونفيهم**

Sezai ÖZÇELİK¹

Abstract: This article aims to make it possible to explain and understand the root causes of conflict in the Crimean Peninsula since the Crimean Tatars have returned their homeland (Yeşil Ada). The analysis of the sources of the Crimean conflict requires to investigate the history of the peninsula and especially the Soviet Genocide (Sürgün). After focusing on the psycho-analytical and psycho-dynamics of the Crimean history, the research uses one of the most important conflict resolution theory, the basic human needs (BHNs) theory, on the Crimean case. The 1994 Crimean Crisis with conflict problems and issues of the Crimean Tatars are examined in this research. In conclusion, the Crimean conflict may be resolved by the application of the conflict management, resolution and transformation. Also, there is a need to have a comprehensive economic, political, democratic and social reforms in Ukraine and Russia in general and in Crimea in particular.

Key Words: Crimean Tatars, Ukraine, Basic Human Needs Theory, Deportation, Crimea, conflict prevention, conflict resolution.

Özet: Bu makale, Kırım Tatarlarının anavatanlarına (Yeşil Ada) dönüşlerinden bu yana Kırım Yarımadası'ndaki çatışmanın ana nedenlerini anlamayı ve açıklamayı mümkün kılmayı hedeflemektedir. Kırım çatışmasının kaynaklarının analizi, yarımada'nın tarihini ve özellikle Sovyet Soykırımı'nı (Sürgün) incelemeyi gerektirmektedir. Kırım tarihinin psikanalitik ve psiko-dinamiklerine odaklandıktan sonra, araştırmada en önemli çatışma çözüm teorilerinden olan temel insan ihtiyaçları (BHNs) teorisine Kırım örneğinde başvurulmuştur. Bu araştırmada, 1994 Kırım Krizi ve Kırım Tatarlarının sorunları çatışma sorunları ile birlikte incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak, Kırım çatışmasının, çatışma yönetimi, çözümü ve dönüşümü uygulamalarıyla çözülebileceği üzerinde durulmuştur. Ayrıca, genel olarak Ukrayna ve Rusya'da ve özel olarak da Kırım'da kapsamlı bir ekonomik, siyasi, demokratik ve sosyal reformlara ihtiyaç vardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kırım Tatarları, Ukrayna, Temel İnsan İhtiyaçları Teorisi, Sürgün, Kırım, Çatışma Önleme, Çatışma Çözüm

الخلاصة: تهدف هذه المقالة إلى إتاحة شرح وفهم الأسباب الجذرية للصراع في شبه جزيرة القرم منذ أن عاد تثار القرم إلى وطنهم (الجزيرة الخضراء) يتطلب تحليل مصادر الصراع في القرم التحقيق في تاريخ شبه الجزيرة وخاصة الإبادة الجماعية السوفيتية. بعد التركيز على التحليل النفسي والديناميكيات النفسية لتاريخ القرم ، يستخدم البحث واحدة من أهم نظرية حل النزاعات ، نظرية الاحتياجات الإنسانية الأساسية، في حالة القرم. يتم فحص أزمة 1994 القرم مع مشاكل الصراع وقضايا تثار القرم في هذا البحث. في الختام ، يمكن حل صراع القرم من خلال تطبيق إدارة الصراع وحلها وتحويلها. كما أن هناك حاجة لإجراء إصلاحات اقتصادية وسياسية وديمقراطية واجتماعية شاملة في أوكرانيا وروسيا بشكل عام وشبه جزيرة القرم بشكل خاص.

الكلمات المفتاحية: تثار القرم ، أوكرانيا ، نظرية الاحتياجات الإنسانية الأساسية ، الترحيل ، القرم ، منع النزاعات ، حل النزاعات.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Although it is not as well-known as the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Kosova, and Chechnya currently there is an escalating conflict with a non-violence aspect on the Crimean peninsula between Russians, Ukrainians, and the repatriating Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars, a “deported people” forced *en masse* to relocate from Crimea to remote parts of Central Asia in 1944, began to return their homeland in 1988.¹ In 1988, after more than thirty years of pressure, the Soviet Union gave the Crimean Tatars permission to return to Crimea. It is estimated that at least 250,000 Crimean Tatars have already returned, and it is expected that tens of thousand more have returned in the 21st century.

Together with the dispute between Russia and Ukraine about the political status of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars’ presence could spark a more fundamental political crisis. Thus, the multi-national peninsula with very sharp ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages is slowly turning into an area of conflict that might turn into violence any minute, if the international community does not pay enough attention to prevent it.²

The Crimean Tatars case provides a clear example of the conflictual relationship between the interest in nation-state building, which is perceived as vital by weak new states struggling to survive as independent entities, and the attempt by minorities to preserve and regain their identity. In the Crimean Tatars case, the ethnic identity is bound to the discourse of “homeland” and the *surgun* (deportation).

This paper focuses on the explanation and understanding of the conflicts in the peninsula over the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. The case of repatriation of the Crimean Tatars has a number of basic features in common with other post-Cold War disputes in the Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) and former Soviet Union (FSU): the presence of minorities whose ethnicity is shared with neighboring states or kin states (Turkey) which are generally supportive of their kin, a situation of post-communist socio-political and economic transition, and the more or less smooth disintegration of multinational states (the FSU). However, the Crimean Tatars case has a

1 During this brutal deportation, over 250,000 people were relocated. Although the Crimea, which is located north of Turkey, is today a part of Ukraine, the majority of the peninsula’s population is Russian. Actually since the 13th century, Crimea was a homeland (rodina/vatan) for the Crimean Tatars until the deportation (sürgün).

2 Özçelik, Sezai. “The Triangular Conflict of Russia, Ukraine, and the Crimean Tatars: Analysis of the 2014 Crimean Occupation and Annexation”, Sertif Demir (der.), *Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives in 21st Century: Prospects and Challenges*, Boca Raton, FL, USA: Universal Publishers/Brown Walker Press, 2016, ss. 143-167; Sezai Özçelik, “The Analysis of the Crimean Tatars since 2014 Crimean Hybrid Conflict”, *Centre for European Studies Working Papers (CESWP)*, vol. XII, issue 1, May 2020, ss. 42-64; Özçelik, Sezai. (2015). “Analysis of the Crimean Tatars Situation during the Occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 with the Conflict and Peace Studies Approach”, *E-Journal of Law*, vol.1, no.1, June 2015, ss. 11-19.

certain characteristic that provides opportunities for assessing the same kind of conflicts in the ECE and the FSU countries. In this study, the research focuses on these characteristics in the analysis of the events and conflicts in the Crimea. The study was undertaken in order to contribute to dealing with repatriated communities especially in FSU region such as Chechnya, Caucasus, the Balkans, and Central Asia

This paper consists of the following sections. First, the historical background of the Crimean Tatars is reviewed. In order to analyze the contemporary conflicts in Crimea today, one must get a clear understanding of historical developments. Thus, the history of Crimean Tatars from 1700s up to today show that past historical grievances among Russians, Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars constitute one of the major root causes of the contemporary conflicts that exists in the peninsula today. In this chapter, the study aims to look into the early history of the Crimean Tatars as well as the 1917 revolution and the establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). Later, it examines the War period, deportation (sürgün) and the post war period (the contemporary Tatar movement and the Gorbachev era). Finally, the paper explores the resurgence of the Crimean Tatar movement from 1990-1998.

After this historical overview, the basic human needs (BHN) theory is applied to understand the sources of contemporary conflict issues faced by the Tatars in the Crimea today as well as the other causes of disputes with the local authorities. In this section, the research probes into both the specific problems faced by the Crimean Tatars as well as the impact of the resettlement. Relations among the Crimean Tatars, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians are currently peaceful, but are potentially volatile. The danger of an ethnic conflict provoked within the peninsula or from outside, remains a serious concern. In the following section, the contemporary problems and issues of the Crimean Tatars in today's Crimea are reviewed. In conclusion, the research suggests some points on the conflict resolution options that were used in the past 1994 Crimean Crisis: conflict prevention regime, the criteria and validity of a model for early warning, the prerequisites and conditions, and the obstacles to the establishment of such a regime.³

3 Özçelik, Sezai and Soner Karagül, "Ukraine Crisis and Turkey's Policy toward Crimea", Karol Kujawa and Valery Morkva (ed.), *2014 Crisis in Ukraine: Perspectives, Reflections, International Reverberations*, Aslan Press, ISBN: 978-83- 939141-7-3, First Publication: Gliwice, December 2015, pp. 99-134; Sezai Özçelik, *The Russian Occupation of Crimea in 2014: The Second Sürgün (The Soviet Genocide) of the Crimean Tatars*, *Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 5(1), 2020, 29-44, DOI: 10.31454/usb.721939

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to analyze the conflicts that exist in Crimea today, one must get a clear understanding of historical developments. This historical outlook helps to prove that there have been ongoing conflicts between Russians, Ukrainians, and the Crimean Tatars since 1700s.

2.1. Early History

“Crimea without Crimean Tatars.”

Tsarina Catherine II

The Crimean peninsula has always been a key crossroad, providing transport and trading links between East and West, and North and South. The Crimean Tatar national identity, which is so closely linked to the concept of its home territory, is of course the product of many years of national development in which the intertwined concepts of fatherland-motherland and nation were developed and codified in this people’s collective psyche.

The process of nation building among the Crimean Tatars actually began with the Russian Empire’s annexation of the independent Tatar state, the Crimean Khanate, in the year 1783. At the time of the Crimean peninsula’s conquest, the Crimean Tatars descended from the tribes of Chingiz Khan’s 13th century Mongol Eurasian Empire and earlier nomadic groups, had an identity, in their shared sense of belonging to the world of Islam. The Tatars of Crimea had maintained a Sunni Muslim identity since the spread of Hanafi Islam into the steppes of the Golden Horde in the 1300s and Islam permeated all aspects of life in Crimean Tatar society⁴. The first attempt to unite the peninsula into a single Islamic state was made by Hacı Giray Khan from around 1443 to 1466. Hacı Giray claimed direct descent from Chingiz Khan, and in fact first attempted to claim sovereignty over the Golden Horde, but his bid failed, and he therefore set about building up Crimea as an independent state. The dynasty he established ruled Crimea until 1783, but from around the end of seventeenth century, the power of the Crimean Tatar state began to decline. The loss of tribute from Poland and Russia by 1700, coupled with the decline of the slave trade meant that the Girays increasingly came to rely on assistance from the Ottoman Empire. During that time, the Ottomans themselves became a declining force after a series of military defeats at the hands of both the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. Therefore, Russia took advantage of this weakness and began to take a more aggressive line towards the Crimean Tatars. The Tsars were anxious to secure their exposed southern steppes against constant Tatar raiding, and

4 Williams, Brian G. “A Community Reimagined. The Role of “Homeland” in the Forging of National Identity: The Case of the Crimean Tatars”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1997. p 226.

needed to wrest control of the mouths of major waterways such as the Don and Dnieper from the Tatars.

Russia first attacked Crimea in 1687 and 1689. A more serious invasion in 1736 resulted in the burning of the Giray's palace at Bahche Sarai. The final defeat came in the war of 1768-74. Around 1773, annexation of Crimea by Russia has already begun. For a decade the Crimean Tatar state lived on in limbo under the rule of the pro-Russian moderniser Shahin Giray (who was also Catherine II's lover). Shahin Giray passed into the Crimean Tatar mythology as a notorious collaborator with Russia, but his attempts to remodel the Crimea in Russia's image were rejected by his compatriots, and in 1783 Catherine II decided to formally annex the peninsula⁵.

From the major incorporation of Muslim subjects into the Russian Empire under Tsar Ivan IV until the mid-eighteenth century, official Russian treatment of these infidels had been harsh. Influenced by the church doctrine and historical experience, the Russians had considered Muslim subjects dangerous to state's internal security and threat to its spiritual well-being. Ivan IV set the pattern for treatment of the Muslims with his two-pronged attack on Islam. He destroyed the institutional foundations of Islam in Kazan by destroying schools and mosques, and removing their educated elite and clergy. He forced many Muslims to convert to Christianity. A hundred years later, in the Sobornoe Ulozhenie (the law code of tsar Alexei) of 1649, a special selection was devoted to the problem of Russia's Muslims. There it was stated that the punishment for ``proselytizing in the name of Muhammad was burning at the stake⁶.

Catherine II, on the other hand, had reversed many policies of persecution and discrimination against Muslims pursued by her predecessors. There can be no question that, from Catherine II's time, the administration viewed Crimea both as a great potential economic resource and as an exotic place to live⁷. Thus, Catherine's interest in Crimea was economic and political rather than national or ethnic, regardless in 1783, the statehood of Crimean Tatars (The Crimean Khanate was destroyed).

After 1783, in addition to deportations, there was also a mass immigration from the peninsula. In 1778, 30.000 Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea, and some 100,000 (out of a then Tatar population of some half million) left in 1783-91. Thereafter, emigration continued at a steady pace before another mass departure after the Crimean War (in which the Tatars were accused of collaboration with the Turks). In the 1850s 100,000 to 150,000 left. By 1860 the total population of the peninsula had fallen to 194,000.

5 Wilson, Andrew, "The Crimean Tatars: A Situation Report on the Crimean Tatars", London: International Alert. p 6.

6 Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, Stanford University: CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p.70.

7 Ibid. p. 92.

Thereafter, the percentage of the Crimean Tatar population on the peninsula began to fall sharply as mass Slav immigration began in earnest. The Crimean peninsula became a popular place for outsiders with the decision to rebuild Russia's Black Sea Fleet in 1870, with the growing industrialization, and with growing popularity of the Crimea's southern shores as a tourist resort.

In Crimea, especially in the coastal areas, there were valuable vineyards that needed to be worked on. Thus, Russian government wanted to persuade Russian landowners and peasants to move to the Crimea to fill the gap of the population who left the land because of political and social change as well as mass exodus of the Crimean Tatars into the Ottoman Empire territories (Ak Toprak).. But, by 1793, Russian landowners were only able to bring 226 male serfs to the Crimea, although they were more successful in settling the other areas of Novorossia.

Instead, the Russians were forced to import various other nationalities to fill up what appeared to be unnecessarily empty and unproductive land. Old Believers, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Germans, and even Swiss colonists were welcomed to the Crimea with handsome grants of land and financial privileges. A Swiss colony took root near Feodosia, a German colony near Simferopol, and Bulgarian one on the river Alma⁸.

By 1897 the Crimean Tatars accounted for only 34 percent of the local population, and only 26 percent in 1921.⁹

The government continued its policy of encouraging colonization and settlement by any possible means during the rest of the nineteenth century. Between 1820 and 1860, this policy was much more successful. On the southern coast of the peninsula, where both climate and land were superior to that in the north, village and town settlement intensified so that by 1854, out of a total population of more than 250,000, the Tatars accounted for only 150,000, the Russians accounted for more than 70,000, and Greeks, Armenians, Germans, and Jews made up the rest¹⁰.

Crimean Tatar emigration developed large diasporas in Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and some in USA and Germany. Today between 2 and 5 million Crimean Tatars live in Turkey¹¹.

8 Ibid. p. 92.

9 Wilson, Andrew, *the Crimean Tatars*, p. 6.

10 Alan Fisher, p. 92-93.

11 Altan, Mubeyyin Batu. "Structures: The Importance of Family—a Personal Memoir", in *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival*. 1st ed., Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia Book Series. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998, pp.99-110.

2.2. The 1917 Revolution and the Establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) ¹²

The First World War produced a crisis for the Crimean Tatars-in terms of both their identity and their loyalty toward the Russian government. The Tatars had been developing a national movement within the Russian system, participating in Dumas, and leading various Muslim congresses. Their economic and cultural life had steadily improved after 1906. At the beginning of the war, there was no reason for the Tatars to oppose Russia's war aims against Germany and Austria; in fact, there was every reason for them to take part in the war in as effective a manner as possible in hopes of cultural and economic rewards.

However, war against the Ottoman Empire caused problems. These arose, not because of any special feelings of the Tatars toward the Ottoman government, but rather as a result of Russian policies against what they believed to be a potential Muslim fifth column supporting the Turks. The record of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar community during the war indicated that their movement for national separation did not begin until the war was almost half over. It emerged as an act of self-defense on the part of the Tatars and other Muslims in the face of a growing Russian hostility toward them¹³.

During the war years, the more outspoken defenders of Crimean Tatar rights were forced to flee the Crimea to avoid arrest. Among them were Numan Celebi Cihan, and Cafer Seidahmet, both of whom became leaders of the 1917 Crimean national movement. Along with other Muslim exiles in the Ottoman Empire, these men formed the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Muslim Turco-Tatar peoples of Russia (*Rusya Müslüman Türk-Tatarlarının Hukukunu Müdafaa Komitesi*). This action played into the hands of the Russian administration, which was now given irrefutable proof of the absence of Turco-Tatar loyalty¹⁴.

During the revolutionary months of 1917, the Crimean nationalist movement passed through three phases. First phase was following the February Revolution, when the Crimean Tatars struggled to achieve cultural autonomy. The second phase was when they pressed claims for territorial autonomy, and finally, following the October Revolution, they struggled to establish an independent state. Actually, the Crimean Tatars actually succeeded in establishing a short lived independence under the leadership of Numan Celebi Cihan, on November 26, 1917, which was taken over by

12 See Kirişli, Hakan. *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916*. Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, vol. 7, Leiden:E.J.Brill, 1996.

13 Ibid. p. 109.

14 Ibid. p. 110.

Bolsheviks shortly after¹⁵.

The Tatar National Constituent Assembly (*Kurultai*) was called to meet in the palace of the Khans in Bahche Sarai on November 24, 1917. Its delegates were chosen "on the basis of a broad franchise of all adult male and female Tatars". After some understandable delay in electoral procedures, the Kurultay was opened on December 9 and continued to meet until December 26, when it accepted a new constitution for the Crimean state. On that day, too, the Kurultai transformed itself into a national parliament and elected from its delegates a Crimean national government led by Celebi Cihan¹⁶.

In 1921, the Nar Komnats (*Narodniy Kommiseriat Natsionalnastei/Soviet Nationalities Commissariat*) granted Crimea a secondary ranking as the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). Although the Crimean Tatars were not given *de jure* recognition as the titular national group in this republic, they were given *de facto* recognition as the Crimean ASSR's privileged native nationality. This is not surprising as it became obvious that the Soviet government may have had an ulterior motive in creating the Crimean ASSR, namely, to use it as a showcase to promote the rise of communism in neighboring Turkey¹⁷.

The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was established on October 18, 1921. Despite the fact that the Crimean Tatars constituted only 25 % of the total population of Crimea, Crimean Tatar was made the official language along with Russian. From 1921 until 1927 the Crimean Tatars underwent the same tragic changes and oppression as the rest of the Soviet people. After Lenin's death, most of the Crimean Tatar intellectuals and the ruling elite perished during Stalin's purges. Furthermore, many members of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia were arrested and charged for being "bourgeois nationalists" and executed. Moreover, hundreds and thousands of peasants were arrested as "Kulaks" and deported from Crimea. On the eve of the Second World War, the Crimean Tatars were totally demoralized, politically weakened and highly vulnerable for any disaster. It was during this period that the second part of the Russian political goal is to have "A Crimea without the Crimean Tatars" was accomplished by Joseph Stalin¹⁸. While most able bodied Crimean Tatars were serving in the Soviet Armed Forces defending the Soviet fatherland, the rest of the Crimean Tatars, mostly women, children and elderly, were being uprooted from Crimea

15 Pipes, Richard, *The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1964, p. 81. In fact, this republic is the first Turkic republic in the history even before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Also, the first female representative in the Turkic world was a Crimean Tatar woman, Sefika Gaspıralı.

16 Fisher, Alan. p 115.

17 Williams, Brian. p. 233.

18 Altan, Mubeyyin Batu. "Ukraine's Nationality Problem-The Plight of the Crimean Tatars", *Crimean Review* 7, no. 7, 1995, p 6.

with a stroke of a pen by Stalin¹⁹.

2.3. The Deportation of Crimean Tatars: 18 May 1944²⁰

Official Soviet historiography damns the Crimean Tatars for alleged wartime collaboration with the German and Romanian occupiers of Crimea regardless of any solid evidence to prove these allegations. Nevertheless, for Stalin the accusation of collaboration was sufficient excuse to adopt the drastic solution to the "Crimean Tatar problem" of wholesale deportation.

During the night of 18 May 1944, without any warning 250,000 Crimean Tatars were forcibly removed from their homes, loaded on trucks and taken to the nearest train station where they were loaded on cattle wagons and shipped off to Central Asia, mostly to Uzbekistan. Due to hunger, thirst and disease 46.2 percent of the total Crimean Tatar population perished during this mass deportation. The deportation was a well planned operation, carried out at a time when the Soviet Union was still locked in a desperate struggle against Nazi Germany. Supervising the expulsion were about 5,000 agents of the Soviet state security services, supported by 20,000 interior ministry troops and thousands of regular army soldiers²¹. The survivors of this mass deportation were confined to highly regimented and strict 'special settlements' until 1956, unable to even visit their relatives or friends in case of emergency without the permission of the camps' commander.

In Crimea, the Soviet authorities took steps to eradicate all signs of previous Tatar settlement. The Crimean ASSR was officially abolished with a decree published on June 30, 1945²². After that, the peninsula became an oblast of the Russian SFSR. Tatar monuments, cultural facilities, and place names disappeared with the latter replaced by hastily constructed alternatives such as "Sovetskii", "Pervomaisk" etc. This attempt to 'de-Tatarise' Crimea is essential to an understanding of subsequent Russian attitudes to the Crimean Tatars. The official Soviet interpretation of the Crimean history now claimed that civilization only came to Crimea in 1783. Before becoming a 'Russian land', the peninsula was depicted as either virgin territory, or populated by itinerant migrants who never put down sufficient roots to justifiably claim the land as their own. The Crimean Tatars were therefore stereotyped as nomads and brigands, a people without a history. Instead, post 1783 history was celebrated, and specifically Russian victories and achievements praised, such as the battles of 1854-55 and 1918, and the German siege of Sevastopol

¹⁹ Ibid. p 7.

²⁰ Allworth, Edward. "Renewing Self-Awareness." in *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival*. 2nd ed., Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia Book Series. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998a, pp.1-27.

²¹ Burke, Justin, et.al. *Crimean Tatars: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention*, New York: The Open Society Institute, The Forced Migration Projects, p 12.

²² Fisher, Alan W. *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 167. This was first published in *Izvestia* on June 28, 1946.

in 1942. In all these events the Crimean Tatars were depicted as marginal or traitorous figures, ever willing to collaborate with invading German or Turkish forces.

The current conflict between the Crimean Tatars and Russians therefore has at its roots two mutually incompatible views of history. Both sides consider themselves as the only true indigenous peoples of the peninsula. The Crimean Tatars argue that their ethnic roots in the ancient population of Crimea, and their achievement of statehood from the fifteenth to eighteenth century, mean that the peninsula is their patrimony as the true "rooted population" (korennoi narod). The Russian and Ukrainian presence in Crimea is simply the result of conquest and colonization. Moreover, the Crimean Tatars do not consider themselves as simply 'Tatars'. They are a unique people with only one homeland in Crimea, while Russians are interlopers whose motherland is far from Crimea²³.

The local Russians on the other hand (and also Ukrainians to an extent, because they are often Russified), have become used to the official version of history which depicts the Crimean Tatars as either an 'ahistorical' rootless people, or as the natural enemies of Russian statehood, whom Stalin and the Tsars were fully justified in expunging from the peninsula and from history. Moreover, much of the present-day population of Crimea is the result of post-war immigration (the population of Crimea in 1945 had fallen to 228,000, and was 2,4 million in 1989). A result many Slavs now occupy Crimean Tatar homes and land, and therefore have a material interest in maintaining the traditional Russian/Soviet version of history. Such stereotypes, however, are obviously a key barrier to prospects for future inter-ethnic understanding²⁴.

2.4 The Contemporary Tatar Movement and Repatriation²⁵

On February 19, 1954, Nikita Khrushchev decided to transfer the entire Crimean oblast to the Ukrainian SSR, as a special gift to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Ukrainian-Russian friendship²⁶. The hidden reason behind this transfer was that the Soviet regime needed to integrate Crimea's economy into Ukraine's in order to solve the peninsula's economic problems. The majority of the peninsula's population was ethnically Russian, and nobody was interested in the views of the Crimean Tatars, who were still living in deportation in special areas under martial law. Few considered the

23 Wilson, Andrew *The Crimean Tatars*, p. 9.

24 Ibid. p. 9.

25 Cemiloglu, Mustafa. "A History of the Crimean Tatar National Liberation Movement: A Sociopolitical Perspective", in *Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects*, ed. Maria Drohobychky, American Association for the Advancement of Science, pp.87-105. Alexeyeva, Ludmilla. *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights*. Translated by Carol Pearce and John Glad. Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1985.

26 Lewytskij, Borys. *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980*, Edmonton, 1984, p. 5.

implications of this move until the Soviet Union found itself on its death-bed in 1991.

The de-Stalinization campaign, launched by Nikita Krushchev, marked a watershed for most of the 20 ethnic groups that had been punished during the war. In his famous secret speech at the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 24-25, 1956, Krushchev had stunned the world with his denunciation of Stalin's crimes. In January 1957 most ethnic groups were rehabilitated, including Chechens, Ingush, Karacay and Kalmyks. Only three nationalities-Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks and Volga Germans failed to receive exoneration. The only gesture made to the Crimean Tatars was the right to publish a newspaper, called Lenin Bayragi (The Banner of Lenin)²⁷.

In a special unpublished decree dated April 28, 1956, the Soviet government almost freed the Crimean Tatars. The catch was that "their properties confiscated at the time of deportation would not be returned, and they did not have the right to return Crimea"²⁸. Despite its limitations, this much freedom was enough for Crimean Tatars to get organized and launch an unprecedented human rights movement in the history of the Soviet Union, the Crimean Tatar National Movement (CTNM).

The Tatar campaign for the "right to return" began with petitions, signed by thousands and sent to Soviet leaders in Moscow. In 1961, one petition containing 25,000 signatures was delivered to the 21st Communist Party Congress. The increasing numbers of petition signers alarmed Soviet authorities, who responded with a series of crackdowns that resulted in harsh sentences for several Tatar activists.

The Crimean Tatar National Movement reached its peak during the Breznev era. More and more people were actively participating in the movement, and as a result petitions with over 100,000 signatures were delivered to the government organs. "On the eve of the XXIII Party Congress (1966), 14,284 letters and a petition signed by more than 120,000 Crimean Tatars, together with seven volumes of data was handed to the Central Committee"²⁹.

During those years, the most important development was the establishment of a permanent Crimean Tatar lobby in Moscow. The Crimean Tatar representatives were able to establish contact with the leading Moscow-based Soviet human rights activists such as Andrei Sakharov, Ilya Gabin, Alexei Kosterin, Alexander Lavut and Pyotr Grigorenko. It has been largely through the work of such prominent figures that the western observers have become interested in the Crimean Tatar question.

The intensified lobbying, demonstrations, and determination of Crimean
27 Burke, Justin, et.al. p. 23.

28 Sheehy, Ann. *The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Meshketians*, London, 1971, p. 9. This is a report prepared for Minority Rights Group in London.

29 Whitaker, Ben, ed. *The Fourth World*, New York, 1970, p. 186

Tatars finally convinced the Soviet authorities to promulgate a decree on 9 September 1967. But nowhere in this decree the proper name of the Crimean Tatars was mentioned. This decree that withdraw the accusation that "citizens of the Tatar nationality formerly resided in Crimea" had collaborated with Germans was published only in Central Asian press and most Russians remained ignorant of its contents. At the same time, although the decree referred to the Crimean Tatars right to 'live on any territory of the Soviet Union', it described them as having 'taken root (kornizatsia) in the Uzbek and other Union Republics', and placed severe practical obstacles in the way of their returning home. Chief obstacle among these was the denial of exit (vypiska) and entry/residence (propiska) permits from Central Asia to Crimea. Therefore although some 100,000 Crimean Tatars attempted to make the journey home in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 decision, only about 900 families managed to settle permanently in the peninsula³⁰.

The feelings of shock and disappointment among the Crimean Tatars were profound and a generation that had grown up in exile always believing in the reversible nature of their displacement began to devise a new strategy to fulfill their goal of returning to Crimea. The Crimean Tatars' shared sense of injustice and their growing frustration with the Kremlin gradually fostered the rise of a mass "Return to Homeland" movement among this dispersed people. In remarkable display of organization and national unity, the Crimean Tatar activists formed action committees in all the places of their exile which worked to energize the Tatars politically, keep their culture alive and forget greater national solidarity. The activists intensified their efforts and the Soviet authorities matched the growth of Tatar determination with an increased willingness to use force.³¹

In this fashion, the Crimean Tatar nationalists issued the first ethnically based, frontal challenge to the Soviet regime in modern history. During that time, dozens of activists and dissidents were arrested and given lengthy jail terms in the Gulag. Demonstrations calling for re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR were forcibly broken up by the militia. Individual Crimean Tatars who attempted to return to Crimea were routinely beaten, arrested and deported. Increasingly more Crimean Tatars became involved in the struggle for homeland by defending friends and neighbors who had been arrested for opposing the forced settlement regime. This was not however, a spontaneous outburst of frustration as in the case of *Intifada*. The Crimean Tatars abstained from violence, the activists skillfully manipulated Soviet law to demonstrate the illegality of their continued exile and the leaders of the movement were, increasingly highly educated or white collar workers³².

30 Wilson, Andrew. *The Crimean Tatars: A Situation Report on the Crimean Tatars*, p. 10.

31 Özçelik, Sezai. "Uluslararası İlişkiler Bağlamında Kırım ve Kırım Tatarları", , Yücel Öztürk (ed.), *Doğu Avrupa Türk Mirasının Son Kalesi: Kırım*, İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın / 168, 2015, ss. 341-367.

32 Williams, Brian G. *A Community Reimagined. The Role of "Homeland" in the Forging of National*

One of the dissidents who is representative of this new parallel leadership among the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Cemiloğlu, emerged as the primary leader of the Tatar cause.

2.5. Gorbachev and the Crimean Tatars

With Mikhail Gorbachev's ascendancy to the leadership of the Communist Party (CP) in 1985 new possibilities appeared for the realization of Tatar aspirations. Gorbachev's liberalization policies rejuvenated the Tatar movement. A petition was drafted and signed by 30,000 Crimean Tatars and sent to President Gorbachev in March of 1987, appealing to him to review the Crimean Tatars' national problem with seriousness³³. In July 1987, a group of Tatars succeeded in demonstrating on Red Square. On July 29, 1987, a group of Crimean Tatar representatives met with Andrei Gromyko. It took the Gromyko commission eleven months to study the Crimean Tatar problem, and on July 9, 1988, it declared that due to the demographic changes in Crimea it was not possible for the Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea and have their autonomous republic reinstated³⁴.

By the late 1980s it became widely apparent that even Crimean Tatars who had never seen Crimea had certainly not "taken root" in Central Asia in any sense, in fact thousands of Crimean Tatars began to move to the Ukrainian provinces bordering Crimea to the north to position themselves closer to their cherished homeland.

Significant concessions to the Crimean Tatars, who maintain their campaigns of demonstrations in Moscow, Central Asia, and when possible, in Crimea, only came after the first semi-democratic elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1989. The Supreme Soviet formed a new commission under Genadii Yanaev on July 12, 1989 which on November 28, 1989 recommended that the Crimean Tatars should be returned to Crimea under a government sponsored plan, and have their autonomy restored. The decision ushered in the beginnings of mass Tatar return to Crimea (83,000 were living in the peninsula by May 1990, and 120,000 by October 1990, but before significant sums could be disbursed to aid the Tatars, the USSR had collapsed³⁵.

Identity: The Case of Crimean Tatars, p. 239.

33 "The Crimean Tatar Representatives' Appeal to M.S. Gorbachev", *The Crimean Review*, no.1, 1987, p. 17-19.

34 Cemiloglu (Kirimoglu), Mustafa "Kırım Türklerinin Anavatanlarına Dönüşlerindeki Dikenli Yol", *Emel*, Ankara, Nov-Dec. 1989, p. 5.

35 "Yanaev Komisyon Raporu", *Kırım-Kırım Türklerinin Aylık Dergisi*, April 1990, p. 44.

2.6. The Crimean Tatars and the Crimean Tatar Leadership, 1990-1998³⁶

The Crimean peninsula had been largely settled over the previous 50 years by Russians and, by the 1990s, there were 1,6 million Russians in Crimea and 620,000 largely Russified Ukrainians. Although as much as 90% of this population arrived in Crimea after the war, the Russian portion still considered Crimea to be part of the historical Russian *Rodina* (Motherland) despite its official inclusion in the newly independent Ukraine. The regional Communist party of Crimea was among the crumbling USSR's most conservative and, while statues of Lenin were being toppled and Communist party assets seized elsewhere in the Soviet Union, Crimea was described as a "storehouse of conservative forces" and an "oasis of communism". The entrenched and unrepentant local communist bureaucracy that had ordered the brutal beating and deportation of Crimean Tatars attempting to resettle in Crimea in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s began stirring up the Crimea's majority Russian population against the Crimean Tatars arrivals³⁷. The main reason for this was, after the collapse of the USSR in late 1991, the Crimean Russian leaders changed course and undertook measures designed to isolate the peninsula so as to preserve Russian power there. Eventually a determined group of ethnic Russians began to agitate for Crimea's return to Russia, and the issue became a *cause celebre* (famous lawsuit) in Moscow

The Russian secessionist movement alarmed the Tatar community, which had little desire to continue to take orders from Moscow. Both to counter Russian separatism in Crimea and to provide better direction to overall repatriation effort, Tatar activists decided to formalize existing leadership arrangements. The *Second Kurultai*, or national assembly of the Crimean Tatar People, convened in the Crimean capital of *Aqmesjit* (*Simferopol*) in 26-30 June 1991 (the assembly was called the *Second Kurultai* in order to emphasize continuity with the body first established in December 1917). The Kurultai adopted a national flag (the symbol of the Giray dynasty on a light blue background) and hymn (*Ant Etkenmen*) for the Crimean Tatar people. It also passed the "Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People" which stated that 'Crimea is the national territory of the Crimean Tatar people, on which they alone possess the right to self-determination'. Furthermore, it declared that 'the political, economic, spiritual and cultural rebirth of the Crimean Tatar people is only possible in their own sovereign national state'. The Tatars also claimed control over all 'the land and natural resources of Crimea'. However, the Declaration also stated that 'relations between the Crimean Tatars and [other] national and ethnic groups living in Crimea must be based on mutual respect and the recognition of human

36 Allworth, Edward. "Mass Exile, Ethnocide, Group Derogation—Anomaly or Norm in Soviet Nationality Politics?" in *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival*. 2nd ed., Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia Book Series. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998b, pp. 180-206.

37 Williams, Brian G. p. 244.

and civic rights'.³⁸

Refat Chubarov, Vice Chairman of the Mejlis, stated at the Crimean Parliament in Simferopol, for the Crimean Tatar movement non-violence was a key, although not an absolute principle. On some occasions the Crimean Tatars could not adhere the principles of non-violence. On this issue, Chubarov said:

*recently the Crimean Tatars have been forced on several occasions to act inconsistently with the principle of non-violence, but these were instances of self-defense, including defending new settlements from pogroms. When the Crimean government threateningly sent in the military or when buildings were being torn down, people would not simply look on without acting to prevent it from happening*³⁹.

In July 1993, the second session of Kurultai supported the restoration of the Latin alphabet, which was forcibly changed first to Arabic and then to Cyrillic in the 1930s, for the Crimean Tatar language.

The Kurultai also selected a standing body, known as the Mejlis, which was designed to operate as a shadow legislative body advocating Tatar issues. Mustafa Cemiloglu, the dissident leader, was elected as the Mejlis President. The Kurultai with the establishment of the Mejlis, the Tatars signaled their intention to become a permanent and immovable part of the Crimean political landscape⁴⁰. Consequently, Crimean Tatars would create their own organizations and would develop their own political strategies.

In the Summer of 1993 radical from the Mejlis, led by the head of Bakhcisarai Mejlis Ilmi Umerov, announced their intention to reestablish the *Milli Firka (National Party)*, the radical Tatar party prominent in the events of 1917-18. According to Umerov, the Milli Firka struggle against both Russia and Ukraine as "occupying power" and against "the authorities in Crimea [who] are a colonial administration". Moreover, Umerov has declared that "our aim is a national state of the Crimean Tatar people, on all territory of Crimea", in which ethnic Crimean Tatars will receive priority treatment.⁴¹ Similarly, an organizing committee for an *Adalet (Justice)* appeared in 1995 under Mejlis member Server Kerimov, as did a shadowy Islamic Party of Crimea.⁴²

Besides *Milli Firka*, there are other Crimean Tatar organizations currently

38 *Avdet*, nos.15/16, 11 July 1991, and Document 1: Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People, Translated by Edward A.Allworth, in *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*, ed. Edward A.Allworth, Duke University Press, Durham, 1998, p.352-354.

39 "The Rise of Nationalism in Eastern Europe & the Former Soviet Union—Different Nationalisms: The Case of Crimea", *Uncaptive Minds*, Special Double Issue, Summer-Fall 1997, vol.9,nos 3-4 (33-34), p. 45.

40 Burke, Justin, et.al. *Crimean Tatars: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention*, p. 28

41 The draft programme of the Milli Firka can be found in *Avdet*, no. 18, 9 September 1993.

42 Wilson, *The Crimean Tatars: A Situation Report on the Crimean Tatars*, p.298.

active in Crimea. One of the main one is the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars (NMCT) that was established in 1967. The NMCT has largely continued the traditions of the protest movement of the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1980s it supported the restoration of the Crimean ASSR rather than the creation (or recreation) of a Crimean Tatar national state, and since 1991 unlike the Mejlis and Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCNM), has challenged the Crimean authorities. NMCT has favored cooperation with the Crimean Supreme Soviet.

OCNM is the largest of the three Tatar groups. After a split with the moderate NMCT, it was formed in May 1989. The OCNM is a radical nationalist party, which although strictly nonviolent, has 600-800 members. Its guiding principle is "the return of [all] the Crimean Tatar people to their historic homeland and the restoration [vosstanovlenie] of their national statehood."⁴³ The OCNM was largely responsible for organizing the elections to the Kurultai in 1991; half of the Mejlis' ruling council of 33 are members of the OCNM.

Since their mass return, the political situation of Crimean Tatars has had three characteristics. Although, their numbers reached at around 250,000-260,000 (10 percent of local population), there were too many Tatars to be ignored but too few seriously to challenge the power of the Russophone majority of Crimea. Second, there was a contradiction between the radical agenda about 'sovereignty' and 'indigenous rights' and the realities of the Tatars' minority position in the 1990s. Third, Crimean Tatars pragmatically and practically aligned themselves with Ukraine and Kyiv, but they often had little support in return⁴⁴.

Since 1991 the Tatar Mejlis has claimed the right of self-determination over the whole peninsula, in effect demanding the creation of an ethnic Crimean Tatar state. However, they are not accepted by Russians and Ukrainians as an official organ. Local authorities in Crimea are still insisting that the Crimean Tatars should be considered as one of the "minority groups" which fails to do justice to the Crimean Tatars' special historical claims and sense of rootedness in the peninsula. If the authorities continue to treat them as a marginal group, it can only encourage the process of the Tatars' radicalization.

Before 1994 Crimean Council election, The Mejlis demanded 24 seats in the 98-member chamber and the right of the Crimean Tatar people to a veto in a council. After mass demonstrations, they received 14 seats in the chamber plus four seat for the other deported peoples-the tiny Qrymchag

43 Wilson, Andrew. "Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming", in *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*, ed. Edward A. Allworth, Duke University Press, Durham, 1998, p.352-354.

44 Chubarov, Refat. "Different Nationalisms: The Case of Crimea", *Uncaptive Minds*, Summer-Fall 1997, nos.3-4 (33-34), pp.48-54.

(Kirimcak) and Qaraim (Karaim) populations. During 1994, the Kurultai held considerable weight in the Crimean politics⁴⁵. In October 1994, İlym Umerov became the first member of the Kurultai to be appointed to a major government post, deputy prime minister responsible for health, social security, and ethnic affairs. Moreover, Refat Chubarov became a head of the committee for nationalities policy and deported nations in the Crimean Council.

The summer of 1996 was a particularly sensitive time for the Mejlis. The Third Kurultai convened in Aqmesjit (Simferopol) in June 1996. The primary responsibility of the Kurultai was electing a new Mejlis. Two-thirds of the Mejlis ended up changing, with radicals such as Umerov and Kerimov. The core leadership remains in place, meaning moderate policies are likely to continue in the near term.

3. BASIC HUMAN NEEDS THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR CASE

According to scientists, social-psychological theories possess strength to explain the emergence of social orders. John Dollard assumed that frustration was both a necessary and a sufficient condition of aggression.⁴⁶ In his book, Abraham Maslow theorized human needs theory.⁴⁷ He asserted that human beings are motivated to satisfy their ontological needs. Maslow enumerated these needs in a hierarchy of basic and meta needs. He believed that the satisfaction of meta and physiological needs (hunger and identity) is very important for human survival and self-actualization.

John Burton indirectly makes a relationship between Abraham Maslow's basic needs theory and the frustration-aggression theory developed by John Dollard in the 1930s.⁴⁸ Today, in the field of conflict resolution, most scholars apply basic human needs (BHNs) theory in order to explain the 'root causes' of intra-state conflicts. According to BHNs theorists, conflicts often occur when the needs for physical security and well being; communal or cultural recognition, participation and control; and distributive justice are repeatedly

45 Doroszewska, Ursula. "Reclaiming a Homeland: An Interview with Mustafa Dzhemilev.", *Uncaptive Minds* 5, no.3 (21), Fall 1992, pp.51-62.

46 Dollard, John. *Frustration and Aggression*, New Have: Yale University Press, 1939, p.1; Oğretir-Ozcelik, Ayşe Dilek. (2017). Explanation and Understanding of Human Aggression: Freudian Psychoanalytical Analysis, Fromm's Neo-Freudian Perspectives, and Bandura's Social Learning Theory, *International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research*, vol. 2, no.1, January 2017, ss. 2151-2164.

47 Maslow, Abraham. *Motivation and Personality*, New York: Haper & Row, 1954

48 Burton, John. *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*, St. Martin Press: New York, 1990; Öğretir-Özçelik, Ayşe Dilek (2017). "Agression Theories Revisited: Lorenz's NeoInstinctivism, Wilson's Socio-Biology, and Skinner's Behavioral Theories", *Journal Of Asian Scientific Research*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 38-45.

denied and threatened especially over long periods of time.⁴⁹

As a one of the main theorists, John Burton recognizes that positions or issues may be only the manifest levels of some types of conflict and that the real conflict may reach deeper, to basic human needs.⁵⁰ These needs underlie interests, values, interests, and positions. Unlike positions, interests, or values, needs are ontological and non-negotiable. Individuals and groups of individuals pursue fulfillment of these BHNs. Burton claims:

*Human needs theory argues that there are certain ontological and genetic needs that will be pursued, and that socialization process, if not compatible with such human needs, far from socializing, will lead to frustrations, and to disturbed and anti-social personal and group behaviors. Individuals cannot be socialized into behaviors that destroy their identity and other need goals and, therefore, must react against environment that do this. Behaviors that are a response to frustration of such human needs will often seem aggressive and counterproductive, but they are understandable in this context.*⁵¹

In the case of the Crimean Tatars, it is obvious that the systemwide political, economic, and cultural disintegration and the attempts at reintegration along ethnic lines are the principal sources for the emergence of an ethno-national conflict. The Crimean Tatars define their national identity in the realm of homeland discourse which connects the political, economic and cultural realms. Their homeland -Crimea- is an inseparable part of their national identity. Competition over political, economic and cultural issues aims to fulfill their return to homeland. Overall, the return to homeland is reproduced by the chosen traumas and chosen glories.⁵² For the Crimean Tatars the main chosen trauma is the deportation (surgun) and the main chosen glory is the establishment of the Crimean ASSR in 1921.

Most BHNs theorists distinguish needs, values, interests, and positions. Positions (or issues) comprise the surface layer. Underneath this layer are interests which are defined as "central to thinking and action, forming the core of many attitudes, goals, and intentions".⁵³ The layer below interests is made up of values-and this where culture enters. Thus, culture

49 For more information, E.E. Azar. *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Hampshire, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1990, J. Burton. *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990; Sezai Özçelik, *Uluslararası Çatışma Analizi ve Çözümü*, Ankara: Nobel Yayınevi.

50 Burton, John. *Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict: A Handbook*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987, p.15.

51 Burton, John. *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*, St. Martin Press: New York, 1990, p.33-34.

52 Oğretir, Ayşe Dilek and Dr. Sezai ÖZCELİK, (2008). "The Study Of Ethnocentrism, Stereotype And Prejudice: Psycho-Analytical And Psycho-Dynamic Theories", *Journal Of Qafqaz University*, 24 Fall 2008, ss. 236-244.

53 Pruitt, D.G. and J.Z. Rubin. *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, New York: Random House, 1986, p.10.

is reasonably deep, but it is far from fundamental.⁵⁴ The fundamental layer consists of basic human needs. Needs are ontologically given and essentially non-negotiable.⁵⁵ For Pruitt and Rubin, interests are virtually universal and perceived as the root of conflict. Overall, BHNs theory try to answer following questions: “What are the fears and concerns that are behind their claims or demands?” “Why is the other party advocating a given position?” “What do they consider to be their BHNs that are being denied, frustrated or threatened?” Answering these questions requires the parties to try to understand the historical and cultural perspective of the other side in order to better comprehend why it feels aggrieved.

In the Crimean Tatars case, there are two positions. On the one hand, the Crimean Tatars demand the re-establishment of national autonomy and self-determination. On the other hand, for Russians, the return of Crimean Tatars means a deterioration of their own living standards. For Ukrainians, Tatars are allies in the struggle with Russia over possession of Crimea, but they are extremely sensitive to questions relating to the unity of independent Ukraine. The stability and inter-ethnic harmony in Crimea are in the interest of both sides. The greater the stability, the greater the economic growth, and the more jobs created. In other words, conflict-prone situation in Crimea costs both sides. Hence, to better understand the conflict situation in Crimea, we should focus on both sides needs. For Crimean Tatars, the basic human needs is the recognition of communal and cultural identity which is closely linked to ‘homeland’-Crimea. On the other hand, both Russians and Ukrainians worry about their physical security and well-being.⁵⁶

The best way to resolve deep-rooted conflicts is problem-solving approach. For this, one must dig out interests and needs buried beneath positions. In other words, one needs to get beneath the surface things-personalities, positions, and issues-to underlying causes. And solutions must fulfill the basic needs of all the parties. In this process, third party’s role as a facilitator is crucial in order to show both parties the effects and costs of conflict. Moreover, the parties avoid positional arguing and emotional outbursts and see a conflict as a problem requiring the parties to work together to find a creative and integrative solution. Consequently, both parties take the other side’s needs and concerns into account when structuring a solution.

There are some major limitations in the BHNs theory. First, it does not

54 Öğretir, A.D., “The Relationship Between Culture and the Conflict Resolution Styles: A Survey Method and a Statistical Analysis” *Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research*, 3 (2), 2008, 96-104.

55 Avruch, Kevin and Peter W.Black. “Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict Resolution Theory”, *Negotiation Journal*, July 1990, p.224.

56 Özçelik, Sezai ve Ayşe Dilek Öğretir, “Islamic Peace Paradigm and Islamic Peace Education: The Study of Islamic Nonviolence in Post-September 11 World”, IV. ATCOSS Arap-Türk Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi, “Ekonomi, Eğitim ve Kalkınma”, 26-27 Ekim 2014, Amman, Ürdün, Ankara: SDE Yayınları, 2015, ss. 237-255.

consider the cultural component of conflict. Second, it is difficult to prove empirically the existence of human needs and the link between these needs and actual behavior. Regardless of its limitations, in my opinion, BHNs theory is still the most effective framework in explaining this particular conflict. First, it attempts to explain interstate and ethnic conflicts that have been dominant after Cold War. Second, it introduces analytical approach and the relationship among needs, interests, values, and positions to conflict resolution. Third, a human needs approach allow us to examine the micro-macro problem by focusing on individuals, groups, structural relationships. Lastly, it has heuristic value for evaluating the extent to which social institutions and structures fulfill human needs. In short, it offers a realistic foundation for understanding the sources of individual behavior, a basis in which to analyze social change and continuity, and a standard by which to evaluate the progressiveness of changes occurring in world society.

4. CURRENT PROBLEMS AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT ISSUES OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS

In Crimea, we have a multi-ethnic state undergoing a painful socio-economic and political transition where the Crimean Tatars are struggling for their perceived rights such as to be a rightful citizen of Ukraine, able to use the social services for themselves and for their families, to be able let their voices heard in the Crimean political arena in their process of nation-state building. Since there are three major ethnic groups that share the peninsula, for obvious reasons, the nationalist card plays an important role in the hands of some politicians and the needs of the Crimean Tatar peoples runs in endless circles.

Today, the returning Crimean Tatars face three major problems: The social conditions, the economic conditions, and Tatars' constitutional and political position of the 'Republic of Crimea' since 1992⁵⁷.

Under the social conditions the citizenship, language and land disputes questions are the three most important issues for the Crimean Tatars. In addition to these three main factors; chauvinism of ethnic Russians towards the Tatars, religious differences between Ukrainians, Russians and Muslim Tatars, and the need for cultural and educational institutions; also place additional burden on the repatriates.

Today Ukraine still does not grant the right of citizenship to repatriating Tatars and still treats them as one of the "national minorities" causing enormous amount of economic, and social problems to returning masses. The ambiguity of Ukraine's citizenship law regarding the acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship is a very important concern for the repatriates. Ukraine

57 Doroszewska, Ursula. "Crimea: Whose Country", *Uncaptive Minds* 5, no.3, serial no.21, 1992, pp.39-50.

does not accept dual citizenship, thus repatriates first have to denounce their other citizenship (in case of most Crimean Tatars it is Uzbek citizenship). Persons born in Ukraine and living in Ukraine at the time of independence are considered citizens. The non-citizens do not have a right to have a place of residence and accordingly they do not register at the workplace. If they are not registered at the work place and don't have a place of residence, they are denied to have an access to free medical care and other social services guaranteed by the state. According to 1997 U.S. Department of States Human Rights Country Report, 100,000 of the 250,000 Tatars who have returned to Crimea are homeless, unable to find jobs, and illness and death rate, particularly among children and elderly people have increased sharply.

In addition as non-citizens, repatriates are excluded from participation in elections and from right to take part in privatization of land and state assets. The 1998 elections renewed the conflict between the Ukrainian state and the Crimean Tatars, because 90,000 of the repatriates were denied to right to have a vote based on their status as non-citizens. As a result they have almost no representation in the Crimean Parliament where they had fourteen (14) representatives prior to last election, elected by the Crimean Tatars themselves. One of the real reasons for this denial was the fear that all Crimean Tatars may vote for the Nationalist Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine) party⁵⁸.

Ukraine seems to be wanting to help the Crimean Tatars to resettle in Crimea, by showing willingness to finance the repatriation, and trying to get the world community to help the Crimean Tatar's return. But if one looks closely one can see that Ukraine's position towards the Crimean Tatars is inconsistent in many ways. First of all, Ukraine's government is ignoring and delaying a decision on the political and legal aspects of the problem. Under current law, more than one hundred thousand Crimean Tatars living in Crimea, forty percent of who have returned, can not receive Ukrainian citizenship.

There is obviously a duality in the approach of Ukraine's government towards the Crimean Tatars. Many Ukrainian politicians can not rid themselves of the stereotype of the Crimean Tatar that was for decades propagated in Soviet history and official propaganda. Soviet history books made sure that "chosen glories" of the heroic Russ against Barbaric Tatars, as well as the "chosen traumas" that caused horrific and painful memories in the hands of Turco-Tatar peoples in general.

The Ministry for Nationalities and Migration that was established in Kyiv in April 1993, and their task is "assisting the return of the deported peoples, supporting their linguistic and cultural rebirth, and defining their

⁵⁸ Doroszewska, Ursula. "We Prefer Ukraine: An Interview with Nadir Bekirov", *Uncaptive Minds* 8, no.2 (29), Summer 1995, pp.55-61.

legal status⁵⁹. Regardless on July 22, 1997 the Ukrainian government and the president's office have submitted a bill to the Parliament under which Ukrainian would become the only official language in Ukraine. The bill proclaimed Ukrainian as the only official language in all social spheres throughout the country, including the autonomous region of Crimea. Furthermore, according to this bill all civil servants and other persons speaking languages other than Ukrainian in public offices could be fined⁶⁰. This discriminatory "Ukrainian language" requirement creates an obstacle for the repatriates. Almost all Crimean Tatars speak Russian fluently. That is because they all were educated within the Soviet system. They also speak Uzbek, since it is a sister language to Tatar, and because the Crimean Tatars had lived in Uzbekistan after their deportation in 1944. Naturally, most of them (especially the elderly) speak Tatar. Thus, Ukrainian is literally a foreign language to them, and this creates another pressure on the Crimean Tatars and their relationship with the Ukrainian government. Currently, Crimean Tatars demand that the Mejlis parliament be recognized as the only representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, but so far it does not seem like this is going to become a reality in the near future.

In the mean time the Crimean Tatar people look at these political and social issues within their own realm. After forty-five years of exile, they are now finally returning to their homeland, their father's lands (otechestvo) to resettle, and their only goal is rebirth as a nation. They all realize that they need to establish both legal and financial conditions necessary for their return and resettlement. They know that this rebirth is not going to be an easy one, but they return to their land regardless. Their land and property was taken from them in 1944, so most now live in makeshift accommodation as they try to construct new communities in the face of economic hardship and the obstructive attitude of local authorities. Although most Tatars are returning to their traditional homelands in central Crimea, severe restrictions are placed on their settlement in the more prosperous coastal strip, the Crimea's key economic region⁶¹. Despite the limitations, they are trying to build houses in towns by carrying stones from the near by mountains, they live without water, without electricity, without any basic human needs. They are also trying to rebuild their social lives from zero in a new environment. Moreover, they are trying to build schools where they can educate their children in their native tongue, print textbooks, construct roads, telephones, water pipes, all of which require the support of a government under normal circumstances. The Crimean Tatars don't have such support, and they take on the government's role themselves. In each village a Mejlis is elected by the local population that takes upon a great responsibility. It tries to arbitrate personal and local conflicts, including between individuals from different

59 Wilson, Andrew. *The Crimean Tatars, A Situation Report on the Crimean Tatars*, p. 20.

60 RFE/RL report, July 23, 1997.

61 Wilson, Andrew. *The Crimean Tatars: A Situation report on the Crimean Tatars*, p. 1.

ethnic communities that might otherwise grow into something larger. The local government is often connected to the Mafia and provokes conflicts that easily could end in bloodshed. Most of the local conflicts are caused by Mafia who wants to control everything. The criminal world at times purposefully instigates tensions, but The Russian mass media uses these local conflicts to foster ethnic conflict in a dangerous fashion. These kinds of twisted information inflict a lot of economic damage on all of Crimea, especially in tourism.

There is no system of education for teaching in Crimean Tatar. In Simferopol there is a School of the Crimean Tatar language, where about 30 students are accepted each year. Furthermore, there is Crimean Industrial Pedagogical Institute, where 65 percent of the students are Crimean Tatars. There are only four secondary schools with teaching in the Crimean Tatar language. In addition the Ministry of Education of Turkey hosts 25 to 30 students each year at various institutions of higher learning in Turkey⁶². This is definitely not enough for the children of repatriating Crimean Tatars.

This kind of an educational necessity inadvertently creates some other problems. For example, there is a Turkish High School of Crimea in the city of Kerch that was established in 1993 by Fetullah Hoca (an Islamic sect/tariquat leader from Turkey). This high school is only for boys and enrolls over 200 students, about 70 % Crimean Tatars and 30% Ukrainians and Russians. There are also plans to open a school for girls. This school's curriculum is mostly in English, with language courses offered in Turkish, Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean Tatar. The school has an excellent academic reputation having won several awards recently. The school is financed completely with Turkish funds. Although this school seems like a good thing for the Crimean Tatar students, due to Fetullah Hoca's hidden agenda, unintentionally it may also help Russian mass media's claim of spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Crimea through finances and ideology that are imported from the kin state, Turkey.

Under the economic conditions, first we can look into the unemployment rates among Crimean Tatars as well as in Ukraine in general. The United Nations Refugee Agency states that more than half of the working age population of the Crimean Tatars are unemployed. Actually the level of the registered unemployment rate of capable workforce in Crimea has increased by 0.7 per cent and on January 1 amounted to 1.8 per cent. At the end of the 1997 for each vacant place of employment as many as 22 persons applied. During the last year 85 thousand people or 18 per cent of the workforce were sent to compulsory, unpaid for leaves. The number of hidden unemployment

62“The Rise of Nationalism in Eastern Europe & the Former Soviet Union-Different Nationalisms: The Case of Crimea”, *Uncaptive Minds*, Special Double Issue, Summer-Fall 1997, vol.9,nos 3-4 (33-34), p. 49; Sezai Özçelik, “Kırım'ın İşgali ve Türkiye: Jeo-Strateji, Kamuoyu, Türkiye-Ukrayna İlişkileri ve Kırım Tatarları”, Ertan Efeğil (der.), Türkiye'nin Çatışma Bölgelerine Yönelik Dış Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Gündoğan Yayınları, 2016, ss. 301-335.

in Crimea is 56 thousand⁶³. For the Crimean Tatars, this problem is mainly connected with unresolved issue of Ukrainian citizenship for the returning Crimean Tatars. Today, 110,000 Crimean Tatars who have returned to their original homeland Crimea are without citizenship. As a result, they are deprived from access to social services to privatization and to land ownership, as well as to legitimate jobs and so on. According to government statistics between 1992 and mid-1997, only 141 stateless Crimean Tatars acquired Ukrainian citizenship. In mid-1997 Ukraine amended its law making it simpler for repatriates to apply for citizenship. However, it is also true that at the same time, there was an absence of mechanism for implementing the new law on citizenship. It is also certain that local authorities, having an extremely hostile attitude towards Tatars, created obstacles preventing them from obtaining citizenship.

Furthermore, Crimean Tatars returning from Uzbekistan, find themselves in deplorable financial conditions. The crisis of housing deficit, tent cities and shanty towns, lack of drinking water, electricity, roads and social services create very difficult living conditions for the repatriates. For a long time Crimean Tatars demand the re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR that existed in 1920s, and request monetary compensation from the Ukraine and Russia as well as from Uzbekistan for their misfortunes after the deportation. Crimean Tatars claim that since they worked very hard and paid taxes in Uzbekistan, now they deserve some re-settlement fees from Uzbekistan.

Although Uzbeks are also Moslem peoples, it was not easy for Crimean Tatars to adjust into the life in Uzbekistan. There existed some hostility between the host Uzbeks and deported Crimean Tatars who were sent to Uzbekistan without their consent. Initially, some of this antagonism was partially based on NKVD's (Narodniy Komiseriat Vnutrinni Del-precursor of KGB) anti-Tatar propoganda among Uzbeks during the years of deportation. Furthermore, Crimean Tatars never saw Uzbekistan as their new homeland. They have always associated Crimea as their one and only "homeland" (vatan/ rodina). The one condition that separates the Crimean Tatars from other deported Turkic peoples is their territorial based identity with the Crimean peninsula. In addition to this very important fact, having collective memory of surgun (mass deportation), re-learning how to live in the Uzbek deserts after being used to living in their green island (yesil ada), poor working conditions in Uzbek factories after being used to be farmers in the coastal vineyards in Crimea, kept the Crimean Tatars from assimilating into the Uzbek society.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars who continued to remain in their places of exile felt both the 'push' to leave Central Asia and the 'pull' of the Crimea. Some of these Tatars had to leave comfortable

63 *Turkistan News letter*. April 22, 1998. These statistics were provided by the Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics.

housing and successful carriers in Central Asia in order to be able to realize their dream of repatriation to Crimea. In addition to this 'pull' factor of repatriation, there were additional incentives for Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland such as the growing xenophobia on the part of the Uzbeks who have recently used the slogan 'Ruskii doloj, Tatarskii Domoj' (Down with the Russians, Tatars go home) that created a push factor for the Crimean Tatars. According to one source, "hundreds" of Crimean Tatar homes were burned and pillaged by Uzbek gangs who fought another exiled nation, Meshketian Turks, in the Fergana Valley in June of 1989⁶⁴. The increasing lack of tolerance toward minorities in Uzbekistan and complete breakdown of civil society resulting from civil war in neighboring Tajikistan has certainly provided further incentive for Crimean Tatars to migrate to the Crimea despite the hostile reception they receive there from the Russian population and the sacrifices made in the quality of life by the returnees⁶⁵.

Furthermore, Crimean Tatars argue that both Russia (Crimean was part of Russia in 1944, and Russia claims to be the legal successor of the USSR) and Ukraine as well as Uzbekistan (host to most of the Crimean Tatars after 1944) are morally responsible for their plight. But so far, Ukraine and Uzbekistan failed to reach an agreement on Tatars. At the meeting that took place in Kyiv on April 18, 1998, Uzbek Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov and his Ukrainian counterpart, Petro Lazerenko, failed to reach an agreement on the return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea. Uzbekistan wants only those who were actually deported to be given deportee status, while Crimean Tatars and Ukraine insists that all their relatives and descendants be included⁶⁶. To date only Ukrainians have provided some financial assistance to Crimean Tatars, although the former USSR authorities had begun to disperse some money before the collapse of the Union in 1991. However, the Crimean Tatars are deeply dissatisfied with the Ukrainian scheme as the money is disbursed by the local Crimean Cabinet of Ministers, and the Crimean Tatars have no direct control over when and where that money is spent. According to the Voice of America report of May 6, 1998, in Geneva, United Nations Aid Agencies have urgently appealed for international assistance to help reintegrate more than a quarter-million Crimean Tatars who are living in desperate conditions into Ukrainian society. According to the same report, Mr. Dolph Everts remarks that assisting people like the Crimean Tatars can help to prevent a conflict within a society.

Thirdly, Crimean Tatars are concerned about political and constitutional position of the 'Republic of Crimea' since 1992. Although the peninsula

64 Guboglo, M.N. and S.M. Chervonaia, *Krymskoe-Tatarskoe National'noe Dvizhenie. Istoria, Problemi, Perspektivi*, Vol. 1, Moscow: Rossiskaia Akademia Nauk, 1992. p. 245.

65 Williams, Brian G. *A Community Reimagined. The Role of 'Homeland' in the Forging of National Identity: The Case of Crimean Tatars*. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volume 17, no. 2, 1997. P. 247.

66 RFE/RL report. April 19, 1998.

remains a constituent part of Ukraine, its leaders, who tend to be pro-Russian and anti-Tatar, have been granted considerable autonomy, and have used it to deny the Tatar political representation⁶⁷. Since 1991 the Tatars have claimed self determination over the whole peninsula, whereas Crimean authorities are only prepared to grant them certain 'minority rights'. This clash between two totally different conceptions of the Tatars' rightful place in the Crimea has led to growing political confrontations between two irreconcilable camps and the rise of extremist groups on both sides.

The law on elections to the Supreme Council (Verhovna Rada) of Crimea that was adopted in October 1993 did not provide for any Crimean Tatar representation in parliament. After these elections, the Crimean Tatars undertook a campaign of civil disobedience in order to obtain representation, including closing down railways and blocking highways. As a result of this campaign, the law was amended to reserve fourteen out of ninety-eight seats for Crimean Tatars. In the last Ukrainian election that took place on March 29, 1998, two Crimean Tatar deputies (Mustafa Cemiloglu and Refat Chubarov) were elected to be at Ukrainian Verhovna Rada (Upper house). This seems to be a fresh start for the time being, but one should also remember that in the same elections eighty thousand Crimean Tatars electorate were denied to right to vote⁶⁸. Although they constitute more than fifty percent of the eligible Crimean Tatars, they were unable to cast their ballots in the elections because they were not considered as citizens of Ukraine. As a result, they have almost no representation in the Crimean parliament where they had (14) representatives prior to last election, elected by Crimean Tatars themselves.

There exist a few different explanations why Leonid Kuchma refused to sign an order that would have granted the right to vote in parliamentary elections to those resident Tatars who have not yet received citizenship. Above all, such an order would be contradictory to the Ukrainian constitution, which gives only citizens of Ukraine the right to vote. But according to Leonid Pilunskij, who heads the Crimean section of the National Movement of Ukraine (Rukh Party), "Tatars had those rights that were in accordance the Ukraine-Bishkek agreement"⁶⁹. Some experts do not exclude the possibility that a particular role was played by (parliaments) balloted the present prime minister of Crimea, Anatolij Franchuk, and former vice-prime minister, Ilmi Umerov, a Crimean Tatar. If those Tatars who were not eligible to vote were allowed to vote, Franchuk's entrance to parliament would have been much more problematic. Furthermore, in the previous presidential elections, the

67 *Voice of America report*. May 06, 1998.

68 Kazarin, Vladimir. *Problems of the National Identity in Crimea and Construction of Regional Autonomy*. Paper given at the Third Annual ASN (Association of Nationality Studies) Conference on April 19, 1998.

69 Kravchenko, Vladimir. *Why is the Ukrainian Government Ruining Relations with Tatars*. Turkistan Newsletter@ISSN:--1386-6265, Crimea Bulletin, May 1998.

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people appealed to people to give their votes to Kuchma's opponent, Leonid Kravchuk⁷⁰. Just five days before these elections, on March 24, 1998 several thousands of Tatars clashed with police in the Crimean capital of Simferopol (Ak-Mesjit). The Tatars began their protest in the Central Lenin square and then blocked railway tracks and a key highway after the Ukrainian parliament took no action on their request for suffrage rights. Eight policemen were hospitalized and an unspecified number of Tatars were also injured in the confrontation. This clash happened, because Crimean leaders and the peoples feared that they will not be properly represented in the local, regional, or national legislatures⁷¹.

A Parliamentary district is made up of 110,000 residents. Meanwhile, under Ukraine's resettlement policy, the Crimean Tatars are not allowed to exceed 27 percent of the population in any single administrative unit⁷². Thus, Crimean Tatars have never been able to achieve a high enough proportion to win a district seat. This problem of representation naturally makes the Tatars feel powerless, and this powerlessness can cause some conflict escalation in the near future.

The tension between Ukraine and Russia about the possession of the Crimean peninsula itself (the ownership and status of the Black Sea Fleet and the use of the port of Sevastopol) create another problem in Crimea. Kyiv and Moscow are both using the Crimean Tatar situation for their own ends. Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement on Black Sea Fleet on 28th of May, 1997. According to this agreement, Ukraine had agreed to allow Russia to keep its share of the fleet at Sevastopol for the next 20 years and agreed to lease their port facilities to Russia. Under the deal, Russia compensated Ukraine for about \$526 million worth of ships and paid \$100.000,000 a year for the next 20 years. However, the payments were balanced against Ukraine's \$3 billion debt to Russia rather than paid in cash. Russia also forgave \$200 million of the Ukrainian debt in exchange for the nuclear missiles removed from Ukraine in 1992⁷³. These are strategic, economic or geopolitical interests on both sides seeking to manipulate the overall issue of Crimea. Furthermore, there are some strategic considerations connected with the Crimea's location, speculating that Tatars could act as a "fifth column" for Turkey. The Crimean Tatar problem is seen by the Russians and the Ukrainians as part of the danger of Turkish expansion in the region, because both Turks and the Crimean Tatars are Muslim and they share a similar ethnic and racial background. All this finds a certain resonance within Ukrainian society and among some politicians.⁷⁴ The continued

70Ibid.

71 RFE/RL report. March 25, 1998.

72 Ibid. p 51.

73 RFE/RL Reports on May 29, 1997 and May 30, 1997.

74 Özçelik, Sezai (2018). "Kırım 2014 İşgaline Kırım Tatarları ve Türkiye'nin Politikaları ve Yaklaşımları", Hasret Çomak, Caner Sancaktar, Volkan Tatar ve Burak Ş. Şeker (ed.),

moderation of the Mejlis-the Crimean Tatars representative organ- can not be assured. The cohesiveness of the Tatar community and their commitment to nonviolence is breaking down. A full examination of the living standards of returning Tatars requires a look at the situation of other residents of Crimea, especially ethnic Russians. The ethnic Russian community in Crimea-roughly 1.7 million people- feels traumatized by the events of the last seven years. Before 1989, Russians occupied a pre-eminent position in Crimea, comprising more than 70 percent of the population. They dominated the political, social, and economic life in the region. Today, inter-ethnic relations between Russians and Tatars in Crimea appear marked by deeply entrenched feelings of distrust, based on myths and misperception. Although Crimea is in Ukraine, only 20 percent of the Crimea's population is Ukrainian, and their presence is hardly felt⁷⁵. This inequality among the repatriates and the local Russian population creates another possible seedbed for a possible conflict in the future.

All of these above issues, demands from all three sides of the ethnic triangle in Crimea are connected to 'identity', security and well being, communal or cultural recognition, participation and control; and distributive justice. In other words, the root causes of all these conflicts can be explained by using the BHNs theory as a framework in their explanation. On the one hand, the Crimean Tatar side demand the self-determination and secession right in order to satisfy their 'security' and identity need, on the other hand the peninsula remains a constituent part of Ukraine as the pro-Russian and anti-Tatar tendency in peninsula try to destroy Ukrainian authority and Tatars' existence in Crimea. One of the main reasons of this situation is that majority of peninsula (% 67) is Russian, and they feel like Crimea belongs to them. This creates a similar situation to Nagorno-Karabagh conflict between the Armenians and the Azeris in the Transcaucasus region of the FSU.⁷⁶

Karadeniz Jeopolitiği, Ocak 2018, ss. 1199-1222. İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım.

75 Burke, Justin, et.al. *Crimean Tatars.: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention*. The Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute. p. 41-43.

76 Özçelik, Sezai. "Rusya'nın Çifte Çevreleme Politikası: Kırım ve Dağlık Karabağ Çatışmaları", Betül Karagöz Yerdelen (ed.), 2. Uluslararası Hocalı Soykırımı ve Bölgesel Güvenlik Sempozyumu, 26-27 Şubat 2018, Giresun, ss. 180-196; Özçelik, Sezai, "Kırım'ın 2014 İşgali Ekseninde Rusya-Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri: Rusya'nın Çifte Çevreleme Politikası", 19. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Türk-Ermeni İlişkilerinin Bölgesel Politikalara Etkisi, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2017, ss. 443-458.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1. Suggestions

Talks on settlement must be tied to a visible economic reconstruction program. It is widely agreed the possibility of conflict are not decrease until the average person has adequate shelter over his or her head, enough to eat, and a job with a steady income.

Neither the United Nations (UN) nor the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) came to the Soviet republics with experience working in the FSU. On an interorganizational level, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs must develop liaison groups to share the information and insights. Ukraine's political and administrative structure is full of obstructionism.

International organizations (IOs) and NGOs must devote significant time to educating the public-both government officials and local populations-about the role of international human rights and humanitarian law, the concept of individual rights, and the role of private voluntary organizations, all of which are still relatively new to the FSU.

Dialogue between parties should be encouraged by promoting and device or process that rewards inter-ethnic cooperation such as electoral or constitutional devices that encourage the development of coalitions and aid distribution to the Crimean Tatars and by encouraging moderate and centrist group such as the Democracy Party of Crimea and the Party of Inter-Ethnic Concord of Crimea.

The Crimean Tatars case provides a basis for establishing general rule for conflict prevention, at least in ECE and FSU. Like all cases of potential or actual conflict in ECE and FSU involve multi-ethnic state undergoing a painful socio-economic and political transition, where ethnic minorities are struggling for their perceived rights against an ethnic majority that is engaged in a process of nation-state building. With past inter-ethnic grievances, some politicians play the nationalist card in order to regain power.

Moreover, the setting up of instruments such as the CSCE missions and the High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM) devoted to conflict prevention has also had a positive effect. CSCE missions and fact finding missions, visits and recommendations by the HCNM, and contacts and technical expertise from the Council of Europe (COE) have greatly contributed to the defusing of tension in Crimea, where the parties are relatively amenable and open to compromise.

Minority rights together with democratic practices and economic stability is one part of the answer. Beyond legal provisions, international action should attempt to improve the minorities' living conditions, increase their presence in administrations and raise the number of centers of education, teachers, newspapers, radio and TV stations, cultural associations and trans-

border projects. The international community can contribute to the financing of some of these projects.

5.2. Obstacles

- Conflict prevention, in an international environment where external interference to states' internal matters is looked suspicious is hampered by the constraints imposed by sovereignty.

- The difficulties of decision-making in most IOs, where consensus is the rule and the slowness of the international community in gathering momentum for action, constitute another hindrance to effective prevention. Moreover, the lack of political will greatly undermines the credibility of international action.

- The existing instruments are also far from perfect. To begin with, IOs have certain inherent shortcomings because of their dependence on the cooperation of their leading members. Moreover, some of the institutions that deal with the key element of early warning are badly understaffed (HCNM) and there is no arrangement for recruiting international mediators.

- Bureaucratic inertia, lack of common interests, and lack of political are at present appear formidable obstacles to conflict prevention regimes.

There is no question that internal violence and ethno-national conflict present an increasing threat to stability in ECE and FSU region. The real danger today is not that the international community may intervene at all. However, sophisticated our warning systems, it is only when conflicts are "on the screen"; literally as well as figuratively, that they received attention. Often, that is when it is too late. We should thus strip prediction from prevention to the greatest extent possible. In the same vein as the distinction between "preventive" and "predictive" medicine, conflict prevention may be the most cost-effective strategy with regard to domestic and inter-ethnic conflicts. Rapid reaction capacities need to be enhanced and relied on automatically. Provided that they can be designed to minimize perverse effects, systemic transformative actions should progressively become part of the operational design of international institutions and NGOs. Priority should be granted to preventing the recurrence of conflicts through adequate reconstruction and reconciliation program. The early warning bell has been rung in Crimea. We should focus on whether the signals are being interpreted properly and how future responses may best be formulated.

In the long run, developing infrastructure for peace requires an increasing degree of institutionalization and long-range planning.

Justifiably, Crimean Tatars want to rectify the injustice done to them by the 1944 deportation. With or without outside help, their resettlement of Crimea have continued until the Millenium. However, poverty is

widespread-affecting many Tatars, but also plenty of Russians, Ukrainians, and others-and a mood of desperation threatens to proliferate. Amid such conditions, irrationality can overpower common sense, sparking a chain-reaction of violence. Even if the influx of Tatars is not a direct cause of conflict, repatriation could be used as a pretext to initiate trouble (scapegoating). Keeping in this mind, The Crimean Tatar political figures especially Mustafa Abdülcemil Kırımçoğlu and Rifat Çubarov have continued to play a central role in determining how development will unfold in Crimea. The international community should therefore implement extensive conflict prevention measures.

As it stands now, the Crimea's problems are so extensive that they can not be completely alleviated by international aid. But additional foreign assistance may ease the widespread feeling of hopelessness among the Crimean Tatars, as well as the frustrations and fears. In my opinion fact finding missions, regional or international NGOs, and some other international organizations can help prevent an explosion of a conflict in Crimea. Conditions are now favorable for undertaking conflict-prevention initiatives. First, after the bloody war in Chechnya, radical tendencies in Crimea, both among Russians and Tatars decreased.⁷⁷ Also, the low-grade nature of the Crimean territorial dispute facilitates the opening of a constructive inter-ethnic dialogue. Meanwhile, constitutional arrangements defining the Crimea's status within Ukraine await finalization, meaning the remains some room for bargaining. Finally, the Mejlis remained in the hands of moderates following the Kurultai in June 1996, meaning Tatars have continued to show restraint for the foreseeable future. Changes in the existing set of circumstances might complicate the chances that conflict prevention measures would have desired effect. Moreover, the diaspora communities of the Crimean Tatars in Romania, Bulgaria, European Union, the United States, Uzbekistan and Turkey may play important and productive role to convince both Ukraine and their home government on the Crimean Tatar question. The economic, political, and lobbying contributions should be increased for the conflict prevention and resolution in Crimea.

The window for effective action may not remain open forever long. Feelings of frustrations in the Crimea are increasing. After the signed agreement about the Black Sea Fleet, the relations between Ukraine and Russia seems to be cooling down, but under the surface there are still many unaddressed issues. Furthermore, there appears to be a sharp division between the radicals and the other within the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. The time is now for effective international action. Waiting heightens the risk of a conflict that could deal a mortal blow to the development of civil society not only in Crimea, but also across much of the FSU.

⁷⁷ Özçelik, Sezai. (2018). "II. Soğuk Savaş ve Kırım'daki Jeopolitik Gambit: Rusya'nın Stratejik Derinliği Bağlamında Kırım'ın İşgali ve Kırım Tatarları", Karadeniz ve Kafkaslar: Riskler ve Fırsatlar: Ekonomi, Enerji ve Güvenlik, Osman Orhan (ed.), İstanbul: TASAM Yayınlar, Temmuz 2018, 179s., ss. 57-76.

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